2026年4月17日，加州律师考试改制方向尘埃落定：自2028年7月起，CABAR将采用NCBE的NextGen UBE。

这也正如我上周在两场交流会上预测的那样。到了2028年，现行MBE题源本身就已经走到尽头，加州继续维持一套旧考试并不现实。

旧考试窗口还在​

目前几个重要州的时间线大致是：

1. Illinois会在2028年2月第一次实施NextGen UBE，所以2027年7月会是它最后一次Legacy UBE。
2. New York会在2028年7月第一次实施NextGen UBE，所以2028年2月会是纽约最后一次旧版UBE。
3. California会在2028年7月采纳NextGen UBE，所以2028年2月会是最后一次现行加州bar。

这也意味着，准备旧考试的同学其实还有窗口。对现在的加州bar和纽约UBE，我们的课程已经非常成熟，尤其是选择题、论文写作、PT和考前押题，都已经有足够多轮考试反馈。随着NCBE和各州把主要精力转向NextGen，旧考试的题库和命题逻辑反而可能趋于稳定，押题也会更有章法。

但窗口不会一直存在。对2026、2027年准备上岸的同学来说，最现实的策略不是等改革完全落地，而是趁旧考试还熟悉、课程体系还成熟、备考路径还清楚，尽量在改制前解决问题。

NextGen不见得比现在的加州bar更难​

NextGen不是简单的“选择题+论文+PT”，而是把选择题、短答案、法律研究、客户咨询、drafting、PT这些东西揉在一起，考得更像一个综合任务。它也会出现select two这种多选题，不再是所有选择题都四选一。

但是，如果和现在的加州bar相比，NextGen反而可能是一种难度的回归。原因很简单：现在的加州bar难在两个地方，一是加州自己论文和PT的评分弹性很大，二是加州特色科目和写作风格对外国考生非常不友好。NextGen虽然题型更新，但科目范围更集中，评分和命题也会更全国化、标准化。对很多中国考生来说，这未必是坏事。

所以我现在的判断是：NextGen比传统UBE难，但不见得比现在的CABAR难。

加州特色部分不会是“UBE选择题+加州论文”​

NextGen UBE官方结构是三段三小时考试，总共九小时，题型包括standalone multiple-choice questions、integrated question sets和performance tasks。

这意味着加州很难用一种特别粗暴的方式引入它，比如“UBE考全国选择题，我们继续自己出几篇加州论文”。如果这样做，既破坏NextGen UBE的完整性，也会影响分数可转移性和全国统一考试的意义。

所以，如果加州未来保留California component，它会更像纽约NYLE那种地方性要求：在主考试之外，加一个单独的线上课程、线上测试或者低风险的加州法组件。它当然也可能设计得更复杂，但不会是在2028年7月的主考试里硬塞回一套旧加州论文。

这对备考策略的影响很直接：未来的重点应该放在UBE和NextGen本体上，而不用担心加州永远保留一套完全独立的论文体系。

我们已经开始NextGen和UBE课程开发​

课程开发这件事，我倒没有特别担心。

我们一个月可以开发完OLQE课程，一天可以把NYLE课程做出来，所以对于NextGen这个还有2年才会被学员首次接触到的考试，课程开发的时间可以说还极为宽裕。我们会提前拆解题型、整理科目边界、积累样题和训练方法，不会等到2028年考前几个月才开始慌。

到2028年7月，家庭法、公司法、信托、遗嘱会变成大法，选择题也有可能出现。我们的新课程安排也会按这个节奏来：除了很快就能生成的AI课，我们会陆续上架人工（也就是我自己）精讲的公司法、家庭法、遗嘱和信托，而且我会按照NextGen和技能题的逻辑来做。我们始终认为备考方向比单纯堆内容更重要。

对UBE Transfer考生来说是好消息​

加州目前通过分数是1390，这个分数其实就是UBE乘以5。即使不考虑论文对非母语考生来说逆天的难度，依然约等于UBE的 278分，这比最高的德州270还高，更远高于华盛顿州的260分。那么以后如果可以通过加州考UBE，即使依然维持最高分（但也不能太夸张吧？就按照目前德州等同的270好了）其他州的Transfer大门可能是开的，比如，可能依然可以通过等同260分的成绩转换到华盛顿州。当然，NextGen UBE自己的分数会是500-750的新分制，具体怎么和旧UBE对应还要看各州规则。反过来，纽约州考到了加州分数说不定也可以直接转过来，and vice versa, 而不像现在如果想纽约/加州双持基本只能考两次，或者JD先考加州+加州执业几年转到某一个州+某一个州执业5年转到纽约州（纽约和一大堆州签了互惠，但不包括加州）这种十分狭窄的方法。对于绝大多想双持的LLM来说，无论我把小众州说的多么稀缺（其实我真心这么认为，我自己就打算在明年注销加州，只在华盛顿州执业），大部分人可能还是想纽约/加州双持，对他们来说可能是个好消息。

今年7月是我带过的历次考试中学员人数最多的一次，我也总说他们是“我带过最好的一届”。学员通过率最终落在了45%到50%之间。这个结果虽然显著低于今年2月份75%的通过率（我反复强调过2月放水的情况不可复制），但比往年都高，也肯定比整体外国律师通过率高一截。结合纽约接近80%的通过率，说明我选择题的教学方法没问题（纽约和加州的选择题完全一样），大部分没通过的学员就还是败在论文上了。如果换算一下，纽约相当于只需要考加州的1330分，而且论文的权重更低，实在是对华人考生更友好的一个考试。

目前外国律师的通过率还没有出来，但肯定比去年的24.7%低，因为只考论文的律师通过率出来了：只有43.4%，要知道这是已经在其他州执业的律师、在今年2月已经把一些久考不过的苦主捞上岸的情况下，依然比去年7月低了5%，说明加州Bar官方有意在把论文往下压。

有意压论文的证据还包括这次MBE的平均分创新高、外加Phase One加分的加持，但整体通过率和去年几乎持平。往年几乎见不到的40、45分甚至0分，今年出现在多张试卷上。如果论文完全说不通，今年是可以被打0分的，这让以往“50保底，瞎猫碰几个55-60，然后把选择题堆到1600+”这种莽过的策略行不通了。有学员去年每篇论文全部照抄题目都获得了50分，今年认真准备，虽然收获几篇60，但也有40，加起来没比去年高多少。Facebook上就有选择题接近1600但论文被打了一篇0分挂掉考试的。我已经看了将近100篇论文的给分，今年没有那种瞎给65甚至75分的情况了，只有几篇我觉得给高了，绝大多数时候我觉得如果放到往年可能可以多给个5分。今年7月，文笔不好分数很难超过60，如果这是趋势，对文笔不好的考生会很不利。

我还是愿意强调选择题对这个考试的重要性，对于大多数挂的学员，选择题还是不够火候，建议以“遍”为单位刷题（特别是我们考前的自编题）。选择题1600也就打败了全国80%的考生而已，这对我们的学员来说不是什么难事儿。

有几个学员的选择题已经拉到了1500+，关于这部分学员需要改变一下，再硬拉MBE的性价比已经不高了。此时论文写作是一道绕不过去的砍。我看了他们的论文，知识点是会的，但是文笔太糟糕了。建议用AI辅助学习一下基本的英语语法，我可能会参考BarMD的方法出几个PT的课程，并在明年对写作投入更大的精力。

总之如果说纽约的结果是一个惊喜，加州的结果可以用没有什么太多意外来形容（虽然放去年估计还可以多过几个人）。说明只要加州Bar不乱搞，结果相对可以被预测。对于所有发成绩给我的学员，我都会逐一回复，不管你是准备明年2月还是7月再战，或者转向纽约，我都会给出中肯的建议。

粗略用AI点了一下通过名单，大约有40个留的内地地址，其中有一多半都是我的学员。除此之外还有不少学员留的北美地址。今年依然有一些光看我们开源材料就通过考试然后来感谢我们的非学员。再次恭喜通过考试的各位。

Linda

Duty of loyalty

A lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to their client and must abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation. While the lawyer controls the tactical and strategic means of achieving those objectives, the client retains ultimate authority over fundamental decisions. In a criminal case, the decision of whether to accept a plea offer rests exclusively with the client.

Here, Dan made a clear and informed decision to accept the prosecutor's plea offer, thereby setting the objective of his case. Linda’s personal philosophy that all clients should go to trial is not a permissible reason to override her client's explicit instruction. By moving for a continuance against Dan's wishes, she substituted her own judgment for her client's on a matter reserved for his ultimate authority.

Therefore, Linda violated her ethical duty of loyalty by failing to abide by her client's fundamental decisions.

Duty Upon Withdrawal

When terminating representation, a lawyer must take reasonable steps to protect a client's interests. This includes giving reasonable notice and ensuring the client is not abandoned at a critical stage of the proceedings without the opportunity to secure new counsel.

Here, Linda sought to withdraw at the very moment her client intended to enter his plea. This withdrawal, which was caused by her own refusal to follow Dan's instructions, left Dan unrepresented at a critical juncture. Her actions failed to protect Dan's interests and effectively abandoned him before a crucial court appearance. Linda might argue that her withdrawal was a strategic attempt to secure more time for Dan's case, believing the judge would not proceed with the plea without counsel present. However, this argument would likely fail. The proper recourse for a lawyer whose motion is denied is to object on the record to preserve the issue for appeal, not to engage in the controversial act of withdrawal, which potentially violates the duty of loyalty and abandons the client.

Therefore, Linda violated her duty to protect her client's interests upon withdrawal.

Pat

Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

A prosecutor's primary duty is to seek justice, not merely to obtain a conviction. This role as a minister of justice imposes a special, affirmative duty to make timely disclosure to the defense of all known evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense. This obligation is continuous and applies even after a guilty plea has been entered.

Here, The accident report concluding the sun was a dangerous hazard was material, exculpatory evidence. It directly supported Dan's lack of intent and was highly relevant to sentencing. Pat's decision to conceal this report after Dan had already pled guilty was a knowing violation of his duty to disclose favorable evidence.

Therefore, Pat violated his ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.

Duty of Fairness to the Opposing Party

A prosecutor has a duty to act fairly toward criminal defendents, which includes honoring promises made as part of a plea agreement. A defendant waives fundamental constitutional rights in reliance on the prosecutor's promises, and a subsequent breach of that agreement is fundamentally unfair.

Here, Pat offered, and Dan accepted, a plea agreement that included a recommendation for a five-year sentence. In reliance on that promise, Dan pled guilty. By later arguing for a sentence based on an "intentional act," Pat effectively reneged on his end of the bargain, thereby acting unfairly toward Dan, who had already performed his part of the agreement.

Therefore, Pat violated his duty of fairness to the opposing party by breaching the plea agreement.

Duty of Candor to the Court

A prosecutor, like all lawyers, owes a duty of candor to the court and must not engage in conduct involving dishonesty.

Pat's argument to the judge that the evidence was "consistent with an intentional act" was a severe breach of his duty of candor. He made this assertion while knowingly possessing an expert accident report that provided strong evidence to the contrary. His argument was therefore a deliberate misrepresentation to the tribunal.

Therefore, Pat violated his duties of candor to the court.

Judge

Accept Dan’s guilty plea

A judge must ensure any guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This requires a direct inquiry with the defendant on the record to confirm they understand the rights they are waiving and the consequences of their plea. If a defendant is unrepresented, the judge has a heightened duty to ensure any waiver of the right to counsel is valid.

Here, The judge accepted Dan's plea "without further inquiry" immediately after his attorney withdrew and while Dan was emotionally distressed. This was improper. The judge failed to confirm whether Dan wanted new counsel appointed and failed to conduct the necessary colloquy to ensure the plea was truly voluntary and intelligent under the circumstances.

Sentencing

Furthermore, if a judge decides to reject the sentence recommendation after a defendant has already entered a plea in reliance on it, the judge must give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw their plea.

Here, The judge decided to reject the five-year sentence recommended in the plea bargain. At that point, the proper procedure was to inform Dan of this decision and ask him if he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Instead, the judge held Dan to his plea while denying him the benefit of the bargain, which is fundamentally unfair.

（题目没问，可选）
Duty of Competence

While a judge is a neutral arbiter and is not expected to investigate the facts of every case, they must be proficient in the law they are tasked with applying. The judge's actions in this case demonstrated a significant lack of competence in basic criminal procedure. The combination of errors—improperly accepting a plea from an unrepresented defendant, failing to conduct the required inquiries, and failing to apply the correct procedure for rejecting a plea bargain—reveals a pattern of fundamental mistakes. Such a series of errors in a serious felony case suggests the judge was not sufficiently competent to preside over the matter.

Therefore, The judge breached his ethical duty to perform his judicial role with the required competence.

(900-1000 words)

Jurisdiction

First, the court must confirm its jurisdiction. Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue, which requires an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Doug has standing because he suffered a direct financial injury (the denial of the PRP) that was caused by the challenged statute, and a court order could redress this injury by requiring his application to be reconsidered under constitutional standards.

The second jurisdictional issue is the Eleventh Amendment, which grants states sovereign immunity from suits in federal court. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to stop a violation of federal law. Doug's suit is permissible as long as he names the state official responsible for administering the PRP as the defendant and seeks only to enjoin the enforcement of the unconstitutional provisions, which is a classic form of prospective relief.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Its substantive component protects certain fundamental rights, including the right to travel. The right to travel includes the right to migrate and settle in another state. While the right is fundamental, the Supreme Court has held that states may impose reasonable durational residency requirements as a condition for receiving state-funded benefits, such as in-state tuition or welfare. Such requirements are generally upheld under rational basis review so long as they are not intended to "penalize" the right to travel but rather to ensure that the recipient is a bona fide resident.

Doug's claim would focus on the statute's requirement that out-of-state residents live in State A for one year to establish residency for PRP eligibility. This requirement implicates the fundamental right to travel. However, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld one-year residency requirements for receiving state benefits like subsidized higher education. The state's purpose is not to deter migration into the state but to ensure that these significant financial incentives are directed toward bona fide residents who are more likely to have a lasting connection to the state, thereby furthering the program's goal of retaining physicians. This is a legitimate state interest, and the one-year waiting period is a rational means of achieving it. It does not create an insurmountable barrier but merely delays eligibility.

Therefore, the federal court should rule that the one-year residency requirement does not unconstitutionally burden the right to travel and thus does not violate the Due Process Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause prevents states from denying any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The level of judicial scrutiny applied depends on the nature of the classification. Classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the government to prove the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Classifications based on state residency or socioeconomic background are subject to rational basis review, requiring only that the law be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

Here, the statute explicitly uses race as a factor for admission. This is a racial classification that triggers strict scrutiny. While the state's goal of improving healthcare in underserved communities is compelling, using race as an explicit factor is almost certainly not narrowly tailored. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Harvard, government programs cannot use race as a determinative factor in awarding benefits. The state could achieve its goals through race-neutral means, such as focusing exclusively on an applicant's socioeconomic status or experience in underserved communities, which only need to pass rational basis review. The use of race as a standalone criterion is a direct and unconstitutional form of racial preference.

Therefore, the federal court should rule that the use of race as an admission factor violates the Equal Protection Clause because it fails strict scrutiny.

The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Supreme Court interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment very narrowly. It protects only those rights related to national citizenship, such as the right to travel between states, to petition the federal government, and to access federal courts and seaports. It does not protect against state infringement of most civil or economic rights.

The federal court should rule that the PRP statute does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and dismiss this claim.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The Supreme Court has made clear that the primary right protected by this clause is the right of a citizen of one state to pass through or reside in any other state for the purposes of pursuing a "common calling" or earning a livelihood.

The critical question is whether attending a state medical school with a state-funded subsidy constitutes the pursuit of a livelihood protected by the clause. It does not. The act of being a student and receiving a state-funded education is preparatory to a profession, but it is not the practice of the profession itself. The PRP statute does not prevent Doug from earning a living in State A; it does not bar him from getting a medical license after graduation, setting up a practice, or competing on equal terms with State A doctors. It only denies him a financial subsidy for his education.

Therefore, the federal court should rule that the PRP statute does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.

(938 words)

Delta Loan

When individuals pool resources, engage in a business for profit, and share in its management and profits, they form a general partnership by default. Partners in a general partnership are personally, jointly, and severally liable for all partnership debts. A corporation is a separate legal entity and is not automatically liable for pre-incorporation contracts made by its promoters. However, a corporation can become liable if it "adopts" the contract, either expressly or implicitly. The promoter who signed the contract (Ann) remains personally liable unless released by the creditor through a "novation."

At the time of the Delta loan, Ann, Bob, and Claire were operating ABC Shoes as a general partnership. They each provided capital, participated in daily operations, and agreed to split profits equally. Ann signed the loan papers on behalf of this partnership. Therefore, the partnership itself is liable for the debt. As general partners, Ann, Bob, and Claire are each personally, jointly, and severally liable for the full $30,000. Delta could sue any one of them or all of them for the entire amount. ABC Inc., which was formed later, would only be liable if it adopted this pre-existing debt. The facts do not indicate any such adoption.

In Conclusion, Ann, Bob, and Claire are personally liable for the Delta loan. ABC Inc. is not liable unless it can be shown that it adopted the loan.

Echo Loan

A fundamental principle of corporate law is limited liability. A validly formed corporation is a distinct legal entity responsible for its own debts and obligations.

Here, The Echo loan was made to "ABC Inc." after it was validly incorporated. Ann signed the note in her official capacity as "President". There are no facts to suggest any grounds for piercing the corporate veil, such as commingling of funds or fraud.

Therefore, only ABC Inc. is liable for the Echo loan.

The Big Shoe Co. Contract

A corporation is bound by the acts of its agents, such as a corporate officer, if the agent was acting with legal authority. This authority can be actual (express or implied) or apparent. Implied actual authority is the authority that an officer reasonably believes she has as a result of the position she holds. Apparent authority exists when the corporation's actions lead a third party to reasonably believe the officer has authority to act on the corporation's behalf.

Here, Ann signed the contract as "ABC Inc. by Ann, President." Although she lacked express actual authority because she did not consult Bob or Claire, she almost certainly possessed both implied and apparent authority. As the president of a retail shoe store, Ann has the implied actual authority to enter into contracts for the purchase of inventory, as this is an act reasonably necessary to carry out her duties and run the business. Furthermore, by holding Ann out as its President, ABC Inc. created apparent authority. Big Shoe Co. was entitled to reasonably rely on Ann's title and believe that she had the authority to bind the corporation in an ordinary business transaction like purchasing inventory. Because Ann acted with at least implied and apparent authority, her signature bound the corporation. As with the Echo loan, the corporate veil protects the shareholders from personal liability.

Therefore, Only ABC Inc. is liable for the contract with Big Shoe Co.

Peter’s Injuries

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior (or vicarious liability), an employer is liable for the torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of their employment. The employee who committed the tort remains personally liable as well. The corporate veil generally protects shareholders, officers, and directors from personal liability for the torts of a corporate employee.

Here, Fred was an employee of ABC Inc. At the time of the accident, he was "driving to pick up inventory," which is a task squarely within the scope of his employment. Because Fred was acting within the scope of his employment when he negligently injured Peter, his employer, ABC Inc., is vicariously liable for Peter's injuries. Fred, as the active tortfeasor, is also personally liable for his own negligence. Peter may sue either ABC Inc., Fred, or both. The corporate form shields Ann, Bob, and Claire from personal liability for a tort committed by a corporate employee.

While ABC Inc. is vicariously liable to Peter, the law generally gives an employer a right of indemnification against the employee who committed the tort. This means that after paying Peter's damages, ABC Inc. could potentially sue Fred to recover the amount it paid.

In Conclusion, ABC Inc. and Fred are liable for Peter’s injuries. Ann, Bob, and Claire are not personally liable.

(776 words)

1

Liability of Ollie

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. Under the principles of premises liability, a landowner’s duty is determined by the status of the person entering the property. An individual present for a business purpose, such as an athlete playing in a rented venue, is considered a business invitee. To such an invitee, a landowner owes the highest duty of care: the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, which includes the obligation to conduct reasonable inspections to discover and either repair or warn of any hidden dangers.

Here, Yvonne was a player on a team that rented the field, clearly establishing her status as a business invitee to whom Ollie owed this high duty of care. Ollie performed an inspection of the field on the afternoon before the game but did not inspect it again prior to the start of play. A jury could determine that this was a breach of his duty. Given that a field accessible to the public could have new hazards appear overnight, a reasonably prudent landowner preparing for a contact sporting event might have conducted a final inspection on the day of the game. Ollie’s failure to do so allowed the broken glass, a hidden danger, to remain on the field.

Therefore, because Ollie owed a duty of care to Yvonne as an invitee and likely breached that duty by failing to reasonably inspect the field, leading directly to her injuries, a court would likely conclude that Ollie is liable for negligence.

Liability of Barry

A coach, by virtue of their position of authority and their role in directing play, owes a duty of care to all participants in a sporting event, including opponents. This duty requires them to refrain from encouraging or directing their players to engage in conduct that is reckless or falls outside the scope of risks ordinarily associated with the sport.

Here, Barry's actions constituted a clear breach of this duty. He specifically instructed Kate to "play more roughly," knowing that she was a "very aggressive player" with a history of starting fights as a result of such instructions. This was not a standard coaching tactic; it was an affirmative act that foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of injury to opposing players.

In conclusion, by intentionally encouraging reckless conduct that exceeded the normal risks of the game, Barry breached his duty of care to Yvonne. As this breach directly and foreseeably caused her injuries, a court would find him liable for negligence.

2

Yvonne's Claim Against Kate

The tort of battery is defined as an intentional act that causes a harmful or offensive contact with another person.

A primary defense to battery is consent. In the context of athletic contests, participants are understood to consent to contacts that are a normal, foreseeable part of the game, even if those contacts might otherwise constitute a battery. However, this consent is not unlimited; it does not extend to acts of violence that are unrelated to the normal play of the game or that occur outside the course of play. While Yvonne did consent to being tackled, bumped, and even knocked down within the course of play, Kate's punch falls far outside the scope of that consent.

Another defense to battery is self-defense. However, it is a well-established rule that mere words or verbal provocation are not legally sufficient to justify a physical attack. Here, Yvonne's question may have provoked Kate, but this verbal taunt provides no legal defense for Kate's physical retaliation.

As all the elements of battery are met and no valid defense exists, Yvonne will be successful in her suit against Kate for battery.

Kate's Claim Against Yvonne

See ruls above.

Yvonne pushed Kate immediately after Kate had punched her. It was objectively reasonable for Yvonne to believe that she might be subject to further attack. Her response—a single push—was a reasonable and proportional use of force intended to create distance and prevent further harm. The action was defensive in nature rather than retaliatory.

Because Yvonne’s push was a justified act of self-defense in response to Kate's initial attack, she is privileged in her action. Accordingly, Kate's claim against Yvonne for battery will fail.

3

The rules for allocating damages among multiple tortfeasors differ by jurisdiction. The majority rule is joint and several liability, under which each defendant may be held responsible for the entire judgment, leaving it to the defendants to seek contribution from one another. To resolve the contribution claim, a jury would be required to allocate the percentage of fault between defendents.

Therefore, Yvonne can collect her entire damages award from either Ollie or Barry. Whichever defendant pays the full amount will then be able to sue the other for contribution to recover the portion of the damages that corresponds to the other’s percentage of fault as determined by the jury.

(848 words)

A. The Petition to Dissolve the Farm Trust

The Farm Trust is a charitable trust, as it is established for the benefit of the public, specifically the "general benefit of the City." Charitable trusts are subject to different rules than private trusts and are favored by the law, meaning courts are reluctant to terminate them.

Standing: The Attorney General vs. a Party with a Special Interest

As a general rule, the state Attorney General has the exclusive power to enforce a charitable trust on behalf of the public. A member of the general public, even one who may benefit from the charity, typically lacks standing to sue.

However, a critical exception exists for a person who holds a "special interest" in the trust. This special interest arises when the trust instrument provides that upon the failure of the charitable purpose, the assets are to be distributed to a specific, non-charitable beneficiary. This provision, often called a "gift-over" clause, gives that named beneficiary a direct, albeit contingent, property interest.

Here, the will states that if the trust should "fail, for any reason," its assets are to be given to "the children of my granddaughter Betty." Betty's only child, Darcy, is the sole contingent beneficiary of this clause. This gives Darcy a special interest sufficient to confer standing to argue that the trust has, in fact, failed and that her interest should therefore vest. Betty, acting on Darcy's behalf, can properly bring this petition before the court.

Precatory Language vs. Mandatory Direction

The will states that Grandma preferred the farm be used as an active organic-certified farm without chemical pesticides. The word "preferred" is generally considered precatory language, meaning it expresses a wish or a desire rather than a legally binding command. It is a guideline for the trustee, not a condition subsequent that would cause the trust to fail if not met. The primary and overarching purpose of the trust is for the "general benefit of the City." As long as the farm continues to operate for the city's benefit, this primary purpose is being fulfilled.

The Doctrine of Cy Près

Even if the organic farming provision were considered a primary purpose, its failure would not automatically terminate the trust. When a charitable trust's specific purpose becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal to perform, a court can apply the doctrine of cy près (from the French for "as near as possible"). This doctrine allows the court to modify the trust and direct the assets to a new charitable purpose that approximates the settlor's original intent.

Because the trust's general charitable purpose remains viable, the court will favor modifying the trust's administrative terms over terminating it. Termination would frustrate Grandma's primary intent, whereas modification would preserve it.

B. The Petition to Dissolve the Ancestry Trust

A fundamental principle of trust law is that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee. While Tom, as trustee, engaged in serious misconduct and subsequently died, these events are not grounds for terminating the trust itself.

Upon Tom's death, the office of trustee became vacant. The trust instrument did not name a successor. In such a situation, the court has the inherent authority to appoint a successor trustee to continue administering the trust according to its terms. The trust's purpose—to distribute income annually to Tom's successors in interest (his estate until closed), Betty, and Carol—remains perfectly achievable.

Since the trust's purpose has not been fulfilled, become impossible, or been rendered illegal, there are no grounds for its termination. The proper judicial remedy is to appoint a new trustee and ensure the trust's assets are restored.

C. The Order to Compel Tom's Estate to Repay the Trust

A trustee owes the trust and its beneficiaries the highest duties of loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty strictly prohibits a trustee from using trust assets for their own personal benefit, a practice known as self-dealing.

When Tom wrote a check from the trust's assets to pay his personal medical debt, he directly violated his duty of loyalty. His intention to repay the trust is legally irrelevant to the fact that a breach occurred. The loss to the trust is the amount of money he took.

A trustee is personally liable for any financial loss to the trust resulting from their breach of duty. This liability does not disappear upon the trustee's death. The claim for the misappropriated funds becomes a debt of the trustee's estate. The successor trustee, once appointed, or a beneficiary (like Betty) has the right to bring an action to "surcharge" Tom's estate, which means compelling the estate to make the trust whole for the loss he caused.

Therefore, Betty's petition on this point is proper, and the court will grant the request to order Tom's estate to repay the full amount he misappropriated from the Ancestry Trust. This action is necessary to restore the trust principal and ensure its proper administration for the beneficiaries.

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近期UBE的各州开始陆续放榜，继昨日德州学员考试通过的喜讯后，晚上纽约考区再传捷报！昨晚9点，NY BAR公布了25年7月考试成绩。

我们第一时间在学员群内通知大家查分，袁律和小林随即陆续收到参加了本次考试的学员发来的好消息。截至目前，本次考试学员通过率接近80%！远超NY官方发布的外国考生46%的通过率！

我们由衷地为成功的学员感到骄傲！许多学员特别反馈，我们提供的备考服务在实战中“非常有效”“非常贴近真实”“逻辑清晰、考点分明”。感谢大家的认可，我们也非常开心和荣幸能陪大家共度这一段努力的经历并见证大家取得好成绩。

对于暂时失利的学员，我们也将协助进行针对性分析、定位薄弱环节，为下一次的冲刺做好准备。

对于美国市场我一直都是躺平的态度，但助手依然坚持要给我安排去美国的行程。她说，今年不见得要说服法学生们来报课，但好歹要让他们知道新生代，不至于和往年一样，压根不知道你的服务和学员的通过率。

所以在美国停留了三周，平均每个工作日拜访了一所法学院。临行之前还被安排了拍摄vlog的任务，所以你可以在B站和小红书看到大概十几所法学院的现场视频和简单介绍。当然，每天一所的访问也不会有什么深入了解，但我已经从排名、天气、学费、生活成本、社团活动、就业、移民等方面尽可能介绍了一些我所知道的，希望对明年申请LLM的法学生们提供一些帮助。

让人欣慰的是，很多人在我去之前就已经知道了我。没有什么比直接被人认出来更开心的事情，如果有，那就是当面夸我教得好或者长得帅了。

即便本次访问是市场性质的，但我是个i人，当面推销这种事情我做不出来。所以在USC的两场交流会上介绍课程的部分也是一笔带过。9月13日线上那场也会是同理。让大部分新入学的法学生知道我的存在，我已经非常满足，至于是否要选我反而并没有那么重要，用服务、教学和通过率说话就可以了。所以我回国之后，短期内不会有太多宣讲活动了，我会把从现在到明年2月考试之间的时间用来专心做内容。

最后感谢在各法学院遇到的学员和非学员们，期待明年7月纽约州的考场再次相遇。

千呼万唤始出来！袁律美国名校线下讲座来啦！

近期很多网友学员看到袁律的美国名校法学院探访系列vlog后都来问，袁律来美国啦？待到什么时候呀？来都来了，什么时候开美国交流会呀？

朋友们！你们要的线下交流会来啦！

感谢多方邀请和协助，在9月开学季，我们将在USC连开两场交流会，欢迎大家来现场交流！

第一场​

时间：美西9月4日 2:00PM-3:50 PM 地点：USC 法学院 Room 130

第二场​

时间：美西9月5日 10:00 AM-12:00 AM 地点：USC 法学院 Room 101

两场内容完全一样，任选一场参加即可

讲座内容​

• 各州考试的申请资格，选课注意事项 - 10分钟

• 考试内容 - 10分钟

• 复习方法 - 10分钟

• 附带聊聊执业和移民的问题 - 不超过5分钟

• 袁律课程的介绍 - 不超过5分钟

• 剩下的时间留给答疑

不需要提前报名！欢迎Walk-in!

欢迎分享/转发给身边的小伙伴，一起来参加！

有任何问题都欢迎随时联系助手号咨询！